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Introduction		The	 emergence	 of	 the	 international	 environmental	 agenda	 in	 the	 1970s	 represents	 a	distinctive	 change	 in	 the	 normative	 basis	 of	 international	 relations.	 Until	 the	 1960s,	most	states	treated	environmental	problems	exclusively	as	part	of	domestic	politics.	By	the	time	of	the	first	UN	environment	conference	in	1972,	international	society	had	come	to	 accept	 a	 responsibility	 for	 the	 global	 environment	 (Falkner	 2012).	 Subsequent	decades	 saw	 the	 creation	 of	 several	 international	 environmental	 institutions	 and	 the	adoption	 of	 hundreds	 of	 multilateral	 environmental	 agreements	 (see	 Corry	 and	Stevenson,	Chapter	1	 in	 this	volume).	 In	many	ways,	 the	 rise	of	 global	 environmental	politics	 represents	 a	 distinctly	 progressive	moment	 in	 the	 normative	 development	 of	international	 society	 –	 a	 move	 away	 from	 the	 pluralist	 origins	 of	 the	 Westphalian	system	and	towards	a	more	solidarist	international	society.	Yet,	despite	the	remarkable	success	 in	 advancing	 the	 agenda	 of	 global	 environmental	 sustainability,	 we	 have	witnessed	 in	 recent	 years	 a	 series	 of	 setbacks	 that	 call	 into	question	 this	 progressive	narrative.	 International	 efforts	 to	 halt	 global	 warming,	 in	 particular,	 have	 shown	 the	inadequacy	of	 the	current	approach.	 Judging	by	recent	assessments	of	 the	state	of	 the	global	environment	(UNEP	2012),	it	would	appear	that	the	march	towards	solidarism	in	global	environmental	politics	has	ground	to	a	halt.		 In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 investigate	 international	 society’s	 response	 to	 global	environmental	 problems,	 focusing	on	 the	 case	 of	 climate	 change.	Building	on	 insights	from	the	English	School	of	International	Relations,	this	chapter	explores	how	the	arrival	of	 global	 environmentalism	 has	 produced	 a	 normative	 shift	 in	 contemporary	international	society,	away	from	its	pluralist	roots	and	towards	a	solidarist	future	built	on	common	purpose,	shared	values	and	international	rules,	but	also	how	this	shift	has	been	challenged	more	 recently	by	 several	 counter-trends.	By	engaging	English	School	theory,	 this	 chapter	 seeks	 to	 connect	 the	 study	 of	 global	 environmental	 politics	with	wider	 International	 Relations	 (IR)	 debates	 about	 normative	 and	 institutional	 change.	Although	 the	English	 School’s	 first	 generation	 (Wight,	Butterfield,	 and	 to	 some	extent	Bull)	 largely	 ignored	the	emergence	of	 the	 international	environmental	agenda,	a	new	generation	 of	 English	 School	 theorists	 (Hurrell,	 Jackson,	 Buzan)	 has	 recognized	 the	significance	of	environmental	protection	as	a	separate	international	policy	domain	and	site	of	progressive	change.	Contemporary	English	School	theory	provides	an	important	vantage	 point	 from	 which	 to	 analyze	 the	 transformations	 that	 the	 rise	 of	 global	environmentalism	has	sparked,	the	traces	it	has	left	in	the	evolution	of	the	international	order,	 and	 the	 barriers	 that	 persist	 in	 international	 society	 to	 a	 more	 successful	greening	of	international	relations.			 The	 analysis	 proceeds	 in	 three	 steps.	 The	 next	 section	 introduces	 the	 English	School	 as	 a	 distinctive	 IR	 tradition,	 focusing	 on	 its	 approach	 to	 studying	 long-term	international	change	and	the	idea	of	normative	progress.	The	English	School	is	divided	on	 the	possibility	of	 such	progress,	as	 is	evident	 in	 the	debate	between	pluralists	and	solidarists.	 The	 third	 section	 examines	 the	 nature	 of	 international	 climate	 politics	through	 the	 lens	 of	 the	 pluralist-solidarist	 debate	 and	 shows	 the	 extent	 to	which	 the	
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United	 Nations	 (UN)	 climate	 regime	 has	 been	 committed	 to	 a	 solidarist	 vision	 of	international	environmental	regulation.	The	fourth	section	then	considers	more	recent	trends	 that	 suggest	 a	weakening	 of	 the	 classic	 solidarist	 ambition	 behind	 the	 climate	regime.	The	current	situation	is	ambiguous,	if	not	paradoxical:	on	the	one	hand,	pluralist	institutions	 of	 great	 power	 management	 and	 national	 sovereignty	 are	 increasingly	shaping	 the	 contours	 of	 climate	 negotiations,	 suggesting	 a	 waning	 of	 state-centric	solidarism	 and	 a	 strengthening	 of	 pluralism.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 crisis	 that	 has	engulfed	state-centric	solidarism	has	also	led	to	the	emergence	of	a	different	solidarist	trend,	 one	 built	 around	 world	 society	 and	 the	 growth	 of	 transnational	 governance	mechanisms.			
The	English	School,	global	environmentalism	and	progressive	change	
in	international	society		The	English	School,	once	considered	to	be	a	case	for	closure	(Jones	1981),	has	made	a	remarkable	 comeback	 in	 international	 relations.	Having	 been	 ‘reconvened’	 in	 the	 late	1990s	(Buzan	1999),	it	now	counts	a	growing	number	of	scholars	among	its	members.	They	make	up	a	diverse	 field	with	wide-ranging	theoretical	and	empirical	 inclinations	but	 share	 a	 common	 interest	 in	 the	 social	 dimensions	 of	 international	 relations,	 and	specifically	the	rules,	norms	and	practices	that	govern	the	interactions	between	states.	It	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 chapter	 to	 offer	 more	 than	 a	 brief	 review	 of	 its	 main	theoretical	tenets.1	Instead,	I	shall	focus	here	on	the	core	conceptual	ideas	that	underpin	the	English	School’s	approach	to	studying	long-term	change	in	international	society	and	how	 this	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 the	 study	 of	 the	 transformative	 potential	 of	 global	environmentalism.			
The	English	School:	key	concepts	and	debates		The	English	School	started	out	as	a	small	group	of	scholars	that	met	from	1959	onwards	under	the	auspices	of	the	British	Committee	on	the	Theory	of	International	Politics.	Its	early	 members	 came	 from	 different	 disciplinary	 backgrounds	 –	 history,	 philosophy,	theology	 and	 international	 relations	 –	 and	 also	 included	 practitioners	 of	 diplomacy	(Dunne	 1998).	 They	 all	 subscribed	 to	 a	 broadly	 defined	 sociological	 perspective	 on	international	 relations,	 focused	 on	 the	 core	 concept	 of	 international	 society.	 By	nurturing	a	conception	of	 international	relations	as	a	social	construction	with	 its	own	rules	and	norms,	the	English	School	stood	in	marked	contrast	to	the	more	mechanistic	idea	of	an	international	system	that	North	American	IR	approaches	work	with.	It	would	therefore	 be	 wrong	 to	 portray	 the	 former	 as	 merely	 a	 British	 version	 of	 American	realism,	 despite	 important	 conceptual	 and	 thematic	 overlaps	 (e.g.	 focus	 on	 security,	balance	of	power,	and	great	power	management).	Instead,	the	English	School	 is	better	seen	as	a	via	media	between	the	 then	dominant	approaches	of	realism	and	 liberalism,	(Buzan	 2014,	 5-7)	 characterized	 by	 an	 ontological	 and	 epistemological	 stance	 that	 is	
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much	 closer	 to	 social	 constructivism	 than	any	of	 the	 rationalist	 approaches	 that	have	dominated	the	discipline	in	North	America	(Dunne	1995).			 Two	 features	 make	 the	 English	 School	 a	 distinctive	 approach	 to	 studying	international	 order	 and	 change:	 first,	 its	 historical	 focus,	 which	 conceives	 of	international	society	as	being	historically	situated	and	subject	to	change;	and	second,	its	embrace	of	an	avowedly	normative	perspective,	which	provides	a	basis	 for	evaluating	international	change.			 With	regard	to	the	first	aspect,	the	study	of	the	historical	origins	and	evolution	of	contemporary	 international	 society	 from	Europe’s	Westphalian	order	 to	 its	expansion	on	a	global	 scale	has	always	been	at	 the	heart	of	 the	English	School	project	 (Bull	 and	Watson	1984).	It	gave	rise	to	an	investigation	into	how	the	Westphalian	states	system	established	 distinctive	 institutions	 (sovereignty,	 war,	 diplomacy,	 balance	 of	 power,	international	 law,	 great	 power	 management),	 how	 colonialism	 and	 other	 forms	 of	political	and	economic	expansion	led	to	the	globalization	of	these	institutions	and	how	the	 process	 of	 decolonization	 integrated	 developing	 countries	 into	 an	 essentially	Western	international	society	(Buzan	2014:	Chapter	5).	By	identifying	different	types	of	international	 societies	 within	 their	 specific	 historical	 and	 cultural	 context,	 and	 by	examining	 their	 change	 over	 time,	 the	 English	 School	 opened	 up	 a	 perspective	 on	contemporary	 international	 society	 that	 focused	 scholarly	 attention	 on	 the	malleable	nature	 of	 its	 foundational	 institutions	 and	 on	 the	 tensions	 that	 exist	 within	 its	constitutional	and	normative	order.			 The	 English	 School’s	 second	 feature,	 its	 distinctive	 normative	 orientation,	was	originally	 centred	 on	 the	 practice	 of	 diplomacy	 but	 is	 now	more	widely	 employed	 to	examine	the	legitimacy	of	international	order	or	specific	institutional	features.	In	what	became	known	as	the	debate	between	pluralists	and	solidarists,	English	School	scholars	discussed	 the	 right	 balance	 between	 the	 need	 to	 establish	 international	 order	 and	maintain	stability,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	desire	to	promote	global	justice	and	bring	about	 international	 change,	 on	 the	 other.	 Armed	 with	 a	 historicist	 understanding	 of	international	relations,	they	examined	particular	instances	of	normative	change	that	(at	least	partially)	challenge	the	existing	order,	be	it	the	rise	of	nationalism	(Mayall	1990)	or	 human	 rights	 (Vincent	 1986).	 English	 School	 theorists	 are	 far	 from	united	 in	 their	assessment	 of	 the	 consequences	 of	 such	 normative	 change:	 solidarists	 embrace	cosmopolitan	 values	 and	welcome	 the	historical	 forces	 that	 are	pushing	 international	society	 towards	 promoting	 universal	 norms.	 In	 contrast,	 pluralists	 express	 concern	about	the	threat	that	norm-driven	change	poses	to	the	stability	of	international	society;	they	defend	a	sovereignty-based	international	order,	pointing	to	the	profound	diversity	of	 values	 and	 cultures	 that	 divides	 humankind.	 In	 other	 words,	 solidarists	 consider	order	 to	be	unsustainable	 if	 the	yearning	 for	global	 justice	 is	 ignored,	while	pluralists	are	willing	to	sacrifice	the	pursuit	of	universal	values	if	that	is	what	the	maintenance	of	international	order	demands.			 Two	caveats	are	worth	mentioning.	First,	 it	would	be	misleading	to	portray	the	pluralism-solidarism	 debate	 as	 being	 about	 two	 opposing	 camps	 that	 offer	 mutually	exclusive	 conceptions	 of	 international	 society.	 Instead,	 the	 English	 School	 invites	 an	
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analysis	of	 the	 tensions	between	 these	 two	versions	of	 international	order,	 for	 ‘world	order	 is	 and	 always	 has	 been	 both	 pluralist	 and	 solidarist’	 (de	 Almeida	 2006:	 68).	Second,	 the	 pluralism-solidarism	 debate	 is	 about	 both	 empirical	 and	 normative	questions.	At	an	empirical/analytical	level,	it	is	concerned	with	identifying	the	spectrum	of	possible	states	of	affairs	along	which	individual	international	societies	can	be	found.	In	the	case	of	environmental	politics,	for	example,	we	can	conceptualise	the	creation	of	ever	more	international	environmental	agreements	and	institutions	as	a	move	towards	a	‘thicker’	level	of	institutional	development	in	international	society,	while	considering	the	 degree	 to	 which	 pluralist	 elements	 of	 international	 order	 continue	 to	 shape	 this	international	policy	domain.	At	a	normative	level,	the	debate	functions	as	a	framework	for	 working	 out	 where	 on	 the	 spectrum	 between	 thin	 and	 thick	 institutionalisation	international	 society	ought	 to	be.	For	example,	 in	environmental	politics	we	 find	calls	for	 the	 strengthening	of	 central	 international	 authority	 to	 advance	 a	 global	 agenda	of	environmental	protection	alongside	arguments	 for	a	more	de-centralised	and	bottom-up	 approach	 that	 acknowledges	 and	 protects	 existing	 differences	 in	 how	 individual	societies	value	and	pursue	environmental	protection.			 Because	 the	 English	 School	 keeps	 both	 empirical	 and	 normative	 dimensions	engaged	in	its	theoretical	and	historical	enquiries,	it	offers	a	more	‘holistic	perspective	on	 international	 relations’	 (Buzan	 2014,	 86).	 Applied	 to	 the	 environmental	 policy	domain,	an	English	School	perspective	would	ask	how	global	environmentalism	relates	to	 cosmopolitan	 versus	 national	 values;	 whether	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 global	environment	 necessarily	 involves	 a	move	 towards	 a	 ‘thicker’	 international	 society	 or	whether	it	can	be	achieved	within	a	‘thin’	set	of	international	institutions;	and	whether	the	growth	 in	 international	environmental	governance	 in	 itself	 represents	a	 solidarist	development	 in	 international	society	or	can	be	explained	with	reference	 to	a	pluralist	logic	of	limited	cooperation.	English	School	scholars	are	likely	to	be	found	on	both	sides	of	this	debate,	with	some	identifying	the	rise	of	global	environmentalism	as	a	solidarist	moment	in	history	(Jackson	2000)	and	others	interpreting	it	as	being	it	consistent	with	pluralist	 international	 society	 (Buzan	 2004)	 or	 considering	 the	 persistence	 of	sovereignty-based	international	order	as	the	precondition	for	successful	environmental	protection	(Bull	1977).			 In	investigating	the	state	of	normative	development	in	international	society,	the	English	School	focuses	on	deeper	institutional	change	at	the	level	of	the	constitutional	order	of	 international	relations.	 Its	key	conceptual	 innovation	is	the	notion	of	primary	institutions	 (Buzan	 2004,	 161-204).	 In	 contrast	 to	 secondary	 institutions,	 which	 are	equivalent	 to	 the	 purposefully	 designed	 institutions	 as	 studied	 by	 regime	 theorists,	primary	institutions	comprise	organically	evolved	social	practices	that	are	constitutive	of	 both	 international	 society	 and	 its	 actors,	 i.e.	 states.	 Primary	 institutions	 are	more	fundamental	than	deliberately	created	secondary	institutions;	they	tend	to	 last	 longer,	even	though	they	too	can	change,	decline	and	even	decay.	Change	at	the	level	of	primary	institutions	 is	 thus	 a	 good	 measure	 of	 profound	 change	 of	 the	 foundations	 of	international	 society	 (Holsti	 2004,	 Buzan	 2004).	 Analysts	 will	 still	 want	 to	 examine	change	in	secondary	institutions	as	indicators	of	deeper	normative	change,	but	the	two	
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levels	 should	 not	 be	 conflated.	 Secondary	 institutions	 are	 derivative	 of	 primary	institutions,	representing	not	just	the	interests	of	the	states	that	have	created	them	but	also	 embodying	 the	 underlying	 norms	 that	 make	 up	 international	 society’s	constitutional	order.				 We	can	thus	begin	to	understand	the	growth	of	global	environmentalism	within	international	 society	 as	 operating	 at	 different	 but	 closely	 related	 levels.	 On	 the	 one	hand,	 the	 idea	of	 global	 environmental	protection,	or	environmental	 stewardship,	has	gained	 ground	 and	 has	 increasingly	 come	 to	 be	 defined	 as	 a	 core	 responsibility	 for	states	 and	 international	 society.	 In	 this	 sense,	 environmental	 responsibility	 has	emerged	as	a	primary	institution,	though	debate	continues	on	the	extent	to	which	it	has	established	 itself	 among	 other,	 and	 often	 competing,	 primary	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	market	or	national	sovereignty	(Falkner	2012).	On	the	other	hand,	international	society	has	created	a	growing	number	of	multilateral	environmental	agreements	that	cover	an	ever	greater	range	of	ecological	issues,	from	species	extinction	to	ozone	layer	depletion,	toxic	 waste	 trade	 and	 genetically	 modified	 organisms.	 These	 regimes	 make	 up	 the	secondary	 institutions	 of	 the	 global	 environmental	 policy	 domain.	 They	 reflect	 the	underlying	 commitment	 that	 international	 society	 has	 made	 to	 the	 protection	 of	 the	global	environment.	Developments	at	the	level	of	environmental	regimes	may	be	taken	as	 a	 measure	 of	 how	 strongly	 embedded	 the	 primary	 institution	 of	 environmental	responsibility	 is.	Thus,	 the	growing	number	of	 treaties	and	treaty	ratifications	may	be	seen	as	an	indication	of	the	strengthening	and	globalization	of	the	underlying	primary	institution	of	environmental	responsibility,	while	concerns	about	weak	implementation	and	 growing	 fragmentation	 of	 environmental	 rules	 may	 indicate	 certain	 tensions	between	 the	 environmental	 responsibility	 norm	 and	 other,	 more	 firmly	 established,	primary	 institutions	 (sovereignty,	market).	 In	 either	 case,	 distinguishing	 primary	 and	secondary	 institutions,	 and	 using	 the	 former	 as	 benchmarks	 of	 international	 social	change,	helps	us	to	gain	greater	purchase	on	the	nature	of	international	order	and	how	it	is	evolving.			
An	English	School	perspective	on	global	environmentalism		How	should	we	interpret	the	rise	of	global	environmentalism	and	its	consequences	for	international	 society	 through	 an	 English	 School	 lens?	 Apart	 from	 Hedley	 Bull,	 who	devoted	a	brief	passage	 in	The	Anarchical	Society	 to	environmental	 issues	(1977,	293-95),	 the	 first	 generation	 of	 English	 School	 theorists	 largely	 ignored	 the	 rise	 of	 global	environmentalism.	But	a	second	generation	of	English	School	scholars	have	started	 to	recognize	the	significance	of	the	environmental	agenda	as	a	potential	site	of	normative	development	 in	 international	 relations.	 Hurrell	 has	 developed	 the	 most	 sustained	interest	in	global	environmentalism	as	a	transformative	force	in	international	relations.	Following	 on	 from	Bull,	 he	 reiterates	 the	 central	 role	 of	 states	 in	 organizing	 a	 global	response	to	the	environmental	crisis	but	identifies	a	solidarist	trend	in	the	emergence	of	 an	 ever	 more	 complex	 web	 of	 global	 environmental	 governance	 (Hurrell	 2007,	chapter	 9).	 Coming	 from	 a	more	 constructivist	 perspective,	 Reus-Smit’s	 work	 on	 the	
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changing	 normative	 constitution	 of	 international	 society	 led	 him	 to	 proclaim	 the	emergence	 of	 a	 green	moral	 purpose	 of	 the	 state	 in	 the	 late	 20th	 century,	 though	 he	warned	that	the	results	of	this	‘ideological	reevaluation	…	remain	unclear’	(1996,	119).	Jackson	is	far	less	equivocal	in	his	assertion	that	the	society	of	states	has	come	to	accept	a	 general	 responsibility	 for	 environmental	 protection,	 with	 state	 representatives	assuming	the	role	of	‘chief	trustees	or	stewards	of	the	planet’	(2000,	176).	Buzan	takes	up	 Jackson’s	 argument	 and	 identifies	 environmental	 stewardship	 as	 an	 emerging	element	 of	 the	 deeper	 normative	 structure	 of	 international	 society,	 which	 ‘probably	now	registers	as	a	master	institution’	(Buzan	2004,	233).			 What	 is	 the	 underlying	 logic	 that	 drives	 the	 growth	 in	 global	 environmental	politics?	 For	 Jackson	 (2000),	 and	 to	 some	 extent	 also	 for	 Hurrell	 (2007),	environmentalism	 is	 a	 distinctive	 area	 for	 solidarist	 development	 in	 international	society.	 For	 one,	 the	 environmental	 movement,	 which	 has	 played	 a	 critical	 role	 in	elevating	 environmental	 issues	 to	 matters	 of	 international	 diplomacy	 (McCormick	1989),	 espouses	 a	 normative	 agenda	 of	 global	 political	 change	 that	 is	 rooted	 in	universalist	green	values.	Environmentalism	may	come	in	different	shades	of	green,	but	underlying	 it	 is	 a	 universally	 framed	 environmental	 ethics	 that	 expands	 humanity’s	normative	 horizon	beyond	 anthropocentric	 interests.	 In	 this	 sense,	 environmentalism	goes	beyond	 the	human	 rights-based	 solidarism	 in	English	 School	 thinking	 to	 include	the	 planet’s	 health	 as	 a	 concern.	 In	 its	 more	 radical	 form,	 environmentalism	 pushes	beyond	 anthropocentric	 norms	 and	 demands	 that	 humans	 adopt	 an	 eco-centric	perspective,	 by	 recognizing	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 non-human	 environment.	 Second,	 the	global	environmental	movement	has	emerged	as	a	separate	force	behind	the	solidarist	transformation,	 playing	 a	 key	 role	 in	 mobilizing	 for	 a	 global	 collective	 response	 to	environmental	 crises.	 Environmental	NGOs	 lobby	 states	 to	 engage	 in	 global	 collective	action,	 constantly	 demanding	 a	much	 a	 deeper	 level	 of	 international	 cooperation	 and	even	 convergence	 between	 states	 than	 would	 normally	 be	 expected	 in	 a	 pluralist	international	society.	And	third,	the	activity	of	nonstate	actors,	both	as	lobbyists	and	as	partners	in	the	creation	of	global	environmental	governance,	points	to	an	extension	of	the	 global	 web	 of	 environmental	 rules	 beyond	 the	 narrow	 confines	 of	 state-centric	international	 relations.	 Global	 environmental	 protection	 thus	 becomes	 the	 laboratory	for	a	solidarist	move	that	builds	global	governance	involving	a	multitude	of	actors,	from	states	to	NGOs	and	businesses	and	from	international	organizations	to	regional	bodies,	municipalities	 and	 cities.	 It	 thus	points	 to	 the	possibility	 of	moving	beyond	 the	 state-centric	international	society	and	towards	a	global	polity	built	on	world	society	(Buzan	2004:	Chapter	4).		 Pluralists	 are	 generally	 skeptical	 of	 the	 solidarist	 vision	 behind	 global	environmentalism.	They	point	to	the	many	weaknesses	of	international	environmental	regimes,	which	frequently	lack	ambition	and	cannot	be	enforced.	And	they	remind	us	of	the	persistence	of	value	pluralism	even	in	a	policy	field	that	abounds	with	universalist	green	 rhetoric.	 Societies	 hold	 different	 views	 on	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 environmental	protection	 should	 be	 prioritized,	 particularly	 if	 it	 clashes	 with	 the	 economic	 growth	imperative,	 and	 profound	 differences	 also	 exist	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 instruments	 that	
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should	be	used	to	address	ecological	problems.	States	may	share	a	common	interest	in	a	healthy	 planet,	 but	 differences	 in	 power	 and	 ideologies	 prevent	 international	 society	from	a	deeper	form	of	environmental	cooperation.	Buzan	sums	up	pluralist	skepticism	when	he	states	that	‘environmentalism	still	represent[s]	the	aspirational	more	than	the	empirical	side	of	solidarism’	(2004,	150).		 This	 is	 not	 to	 suggest	 that	 pluralists	 cannot	 envisage	 some	 form	 of	 inter-governmental	cooperation	on	environmental	problems.	As	Buzan	reminds	us,	‘elements	of	 environmentalism	 can	 develop,	 and	 have	 done	 so,	 within	 the	 pluralist	 logic	 of	coexistence’	 (2004,	 150).	 Indeed,	 where	 environmental	 degradation	 poses	 a	 serious	threat	to	the	survival	of	sovereign	states,	we	should	expect	them	to	attempt	to	solve	the	underlying	problem	through	some	form	of	international	cooperation,	even	if	this	is	far	from	 the	 solidarist	 vision	 of	 collective	 green	 action.	 In	 this	 context,	 one	 can	 point	 to	various	 transboundary	 forms	of	 pollution,	which	have	 led	 to	 limited	developments	 in	international	law	that	seek	to	strengthen	the	harm	prevention	principle	(Elliott	2006),	or	 the	 international	 regime	 to	 avert	 the	 depletion	 of	 the	 stratospheric	 ozone	 layer,	which	posed	a	serious	threat	to	human	health	especially	in	countries	close	to	the	Arctic	and	Antarctic	circles	(Parson	2003).	Both	the	regulation	of	transboundary	air	pollution	and	 restrictions	 on	 ozone-depleting	 substances	 required	 only	 a	 minimal	 level	 of	intervention	 into	 domestic	 policy	 domains	 and	 were	 compatible	 with	 a	 fairly	 strict	stance	on	protecting	national	sovereignty	and	non-intervention.			 As	we	have	seen,	the	English	School	provides	a	macro-perspective	on	the	rise	of	global	 environmentalism	 that	 allows	 us	 to	 work	 out	 its	 broader	 significance	 for	 the	development	 of	 international	 society’s	 normative	 structure.	 The	 following	 section	examines	 the	 international	politics	of	climate	change	 in	order	 to	shed	 further	 light	on	how	solidarist	and	pluralist	 logics	shape	global	environmental	politics	in	this	critically	important	area.	This	is	not	simply	about	deciding	whether	solidarism	or	pluralism	best	captures	the	reality	of	 international	climate	politics:	solidarism	and	pluralism	are	best	thought	of	 as	 two	qualities	of	 international	 society	 that	 are	both	at	work	at	 the	 same	time,	often	in	tension	with	each	other,	sometimes	working	in	tandem.			
Pluralism	versus	solidarism	in	international	climate	politics			This	section	engages	the	pluralist-solidarist	debate	in	an	analysis	of	long-term	trends	in	the	 international	 politics	 of	 climate	 change.	 It	 first	 explores	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 climate	change	 problem,	 asking	 whether	 it	 can	 be	 solved	 within	 the	 confines	 of	 a	 pluralist	international	society,	or	whether	it	requires	a	more	solidarist	response.	In	other	words,	is	 a	 logic	 of	 co-existence	 sufficient	 to	 organize	 effective	 collective	 action	 at	 the	international	level,	or	is	a	deeper	level	of	international	cooperation,	based	on	a	thicker	set	of	international	rules	and	institutions,	needed	to	halt	global	warming?	The	analysis	then	turns	to	the	existing	international	climate	regime	and	asks	where	it	can	be	found	on	 the	 spectrum	 between	 pluralist	 and	 solidarist	 international	 society.	 Over	 twenty	years	 of	 negotiations	 have	 resulted	 in	 a	 governance	 system	 that	 is	 built	 around	 an	international	 treaty-system	 and	 an	 ever-larger	 array	 of	 regulatory	 instruments	 and	
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institutions,	 but	 does	 this	 dramatic	 increase	 in	 international	 institution-building	amount	to	a	shift	towards	solidarist	cooperation?		
The	international	climate	response:	co-existence	or	cooperation?		To	 say	 that	 manmade	 climate	 change	 is	 a	 ‘problem’	 that	 requires	 an	 internationally	coordinated	 response	 hardly	 does	 justice	 to	 the	 severity	 of	 the	 challenge.	 Based	 on	current	 predictions	 of	 future	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	 and	 the	 additional	 global	warming	that	they	are	likely	to	produce	over	the	course	of	this	century,	scientists	warn	of	devastating	and	irreversible	impacts	on	human	societies.	Expected	changes	in	global	temperatures,	 ocean	 chemistry,	 sea	 levels,	weather	patterns	 and	agricultural	 patterns	all	combine	to	make	climate	change	 ‘the	global	challenge	of	modern	times’	 (Hoffmann	2013,	 3).	While	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	world	 needs	 to	 halt,	 and	 then	 greatly	 reduce,	 the	currently	 rising	 emission	 levels,	 we	 are	 far	 from	 having	 developed	 a	 good	understanding	 of	 how	 to	 mitigate	 climate	 change.	 Reducing	 greenhouse	 gases	 will	require	unprecedented	changes	 to	 the	way	societies	and	economies	are	organized.	To	achieve	 the	 needed	 industrial	 transformation	 in	 a	 relatively	 short	 timescale	 requires	concerted	efforts	by	nearly	all	major	emitters.	Climate	change	has	therefore	emerged	as	one	 of	 the	 most	 intractable	 collective	 action	 problems	 in	 international	 relations.	Uncertainty	 about	 long-term	 trends,	 divergent	 interests	 and	 endemic	 free	 riding	incentives	all	combine	to	make	climate	change	a	particularly	complex	global	problem.			 Could	 the	 pluralist	 logic	 of	 co-existence	 on	 its	 own	 compel	 states	 to	 take	 the	required	 action	 on	 climate	 change?	 English	 School	 authors	 have	 traditionally	 viewed	international	 environmental	 cooperation	as	 a	 form	of	 solidarist	 cooperation	based	on	shared	values	and	interests	(Bull	1977,	70).	In	contrast,	Buzan	(2004)	has	argued	more	recently	that	some	form	of	international	environmental	cooperation	should	be	expected	even	in	a	pluralist	context,	particularly	if	core	state	interests	are	at	stake	and	if	effective	measures	are	available.	As	was	the	case	with	the	Montreal	Protocol	to	protect	the	ozone	layer,	 leading	 industrialised	 countries	 can	 come	 together	 to	 avert	 an	 environmental	crisis	 that	 poses	 a	 direct	 threat	 to	 the	 health	 of	 their	 citizens.	 Climate	 change	 is	increasingly	 seen	 as	 such	 a	 threat,	 both	 to	 large	 numbers	 of	 vulnerable	 people	 and	states.	Furthermore,	climate	change	may	pose	a	threat	to	international	security	where	it	acts	as	a	threat	multiplier	in	failing	or	failed	states	(Gemenne	et	al.	2014).	It	is	telling	in	this	context	that	military	organizations	in	the	United	States	and	other	Western	powers	have	 already	 devoted	 considerable	 efforts	 to	 studying	 the	 security	 implications	 of	climate	change.	Unlike	many	environmental	problems,	therefore,	climate	change	could	be	 viewed	 as	 an	 existential	 threat	 to	 the	 core	 interests	 of	 the	 society	 of	 states,	potentially	giving	rise	to	a	coordinated	response	based	on	the	logic	of	co-existence.			 Whether	or	not	climate	change	poses	an	immediate	and	urgent	security	risk	for	most	states	remains	contested,	however,	and	in	 fact	some	of	the	most	powerful	states	face	only	comparatively	weak	security	 threats	 from	a	warming	climate.	 It	 is	 therefore	far	from	clear	whether	a	pluralist	solution	would	come	about	through	collective	action	by	 the	great	powers.	Furthermore,	mitigating	climate	change	 is	 likely	 to	be	expensive	
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and,	 unlike	 in	 the	 case	 of	 ozone	 layer	 protection,	 no	 easy	 technological	 solutions	 are	available.	Again,	it	is	fair	to	conclude	that	the	high	costs	of	taking	action,	combined	with	uneven	 levels	 of	 security	 threats,	 will	 reduce	 the	 likelihood	 that	 a	 predominantly	pluralist	logic	of	coordinating	national	policies	to	avert	dangerous	global	warming	will	suffice.	 Some	 great	 powers	may	 simply	 choose	 to	 adapt	 to	 a	warming	 climate	 rather	than	 invest	 in	mitigation	measures.	Of	course,	 if	a	dramatic	 increase	 in	 the	severity	of	climate	 change	 or	 some	 catastrophic	 event	 triggered	 by	 global	 warming	 were	 to	happen,	 then	 that	might	 jolt	 the	major	 powers	 into	 collective	 action.	 Alternatively,	 a	dramatic	 worsening	 of	 the	 situation	 might	 produce	 a	 different	 reaction.	 Rather	 than	seek	to	cooperate	with	others,	which	could	prove	time-consuming	and	costly,	the	most	powerful	states	might	respond	by	taking	unilateral	measures,	for	example	by	deploying	geo-engineering	 technologies.	 This	 option	 would	 raise	 the	 question,	 apart	 from	 its	feasibility,	 of	 how	 to	 govern	 the	 use	 of	 such	 unilateral	 interventions	 on	 a	 global	atmospheric	scale	(Bodansky	2013).			 It	is	fair	to	conclude,	therefore,	that	a	logic	of	co-existence	is	unlikely	to	generate	a	comprehensive	and	timely	collective	response	to	global	warming.	Faced	with	a	slowly	rising	 threat	 of	 climate	 change	 that	 affects	 countries	 differently	 around	 the	 world,	international	 society	 would	 need	 to	 develop	 an	 international	 response	 based	 on	 a	higher	 degree	 of	 normative	 convergence	 around	 the	 objective	 of	 global	 climate	protection.	 Viewed	 through	 an	 English	 School	 lens,	 climate	 change	 thus	 represents	 a	global	collective	action	problem	that	requires	a	solidarist	development	in	international	society.	 There	 are	 several	 reasons	 for	why	 an	 unusually	 high	 degree	 of	 international	cooperation	is	needed	to	tackle	the	climate	change	problem:	 it	 is	partly	a	reflection	of	the	 complexity	 of	 the	 mitigation	 task,	 which	 involves	 de-carbonising	 the	 global	economy,	 including	 entire	 energy	 systems,	 supply	 chains	 and	 urban	 infrastructure.	Climate	 mitigation	 also	 produces	 severe	 distributional	 conflicts,	 which	 makes	cooperation	 more	 difficult	 to	 achieve	 unless	 leading	 emitters	 share	 a	 normative	commitment	 to	 global	 climate	 stabilization.	 And	 to	 counter	 the	 inevitable	 free-riding	incentives	that	are	multilateral	forms	of	climate	cooperation	create,	strong	international	institutions	are	needed	to	make	mitigation	commitments	stick	and	create	trust	among	the	 major	 emitters.	 Furthermore,	 as	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 states	 alone	 have	 sufficient	steering	power	 to	bring	 about	 a	 global	 green	 transformation	on	 the	 scale	 required	 to	halt	 global	warming,	 a	wide	 range	 of	 nonstate	 actors	will	 need	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 the	global	collective	response,	again	pointing	towards	a	more	solidarist	framework	of	global	climate	governance.			
The	solidarist	ambition	of	the	UNFCCC	regime		The	English	School	concept	of	solidarism	is	a	label	that	captures	a	profound	change	in	international	relations	along	four	dimensions:		 ‘the	move	to	institutions	and	expansion	of	global	rule-making;	changes	in	the	making,	development,	and	justification	of	international	law;	the	increasing	emphasis	placed	on	
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the	 enforcement	 of	 international	 norms	 and	 rules;	 and	 a	 changed	 understanding	 of	the	state	and	of	state	sovereignty’	(Hurrell	2007:	58).		Global	 environmental	 politics	 can	 be	 said	 to	 have	 made	 big	 strides	 in	 a	 solidarist	direction.	 It	 has	 led	 to	 the	 comprehensive	 institutionalization	 of	 international	environmental	policy;	it	has	resulted	in	a	deepening	of	international	environmental	law	and	 its	 expansion	 to	 cover	ever	more	 issues	of	 global	 concern;	 it	has	 sparked	greater	interest	in	mechanisms	to	promote	compliance	with	international	environmental	rules;	and	it	has	contributed	to	a	rebalancing	between	the	state’s	sovereign	rights	and	global	responsibilities,	prompted	not	least	by	shifts	in	domestic	societal	values	and	a	growth	in	transnational	 networks	 that	 increasingly	 circumvent	 or	 complement	 the	 state’s	authority.	Such	solidarist	ambition	has	also	been	a	strong	current	 in	 the	 international	politics	 of	 climate	 change	 from	 its	 origins	 in	 the	 1980s.	 Scientists,	 campaigners	 and	diplomats	 have	 routinely	 appealed	 to	 states’	 responsibility	 towards	 the	 global	environment,	 urging	 leaders	 to	 agree	 legally	 binding	 international	 agreements	 that	would	 mandate	 greenhouse	 gas	 emission	 cuts.	 They	 have	 argued	 for	 the	 creation	 of	strong	international	institutions,	including	for	the	distribution	of	climate	aid	to	support	mitigation	 and	 adaptation	 policies	 worldwide.	 And	 they	 have	 urged	 international	society	 to	 base	 climate	 action	 on	 strong	 notions	 of	 international	 equity	 and	 burden-sharing.			 The	timing	of	the	emergence	of	the	international	climate	change	agenda	helped	to	 reinforce	 a	 broader	 solidarist	 agenda.	 The	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	 War	 opened	 up	 the	possibility	 for	 considerable	 normative	 expansion	 in	 international	 society.	 It	 also	 gave	rise	to	a	more	expansive	approach	to	global	rule-making,	focused	on	the	United	Nations	but	 also	 involving	 nonstate	 actors	 such	 as	NGOs	 and	 scientific	 organisations	 in	 novel	governance	approaches.	UNFCCC	negotiations	also	coincided	with	a	dramatic	 increase	in	attention	to	global	environmental	problems,	culminating	in	the	1992	UN	Conference	on	Environment	and	Development.	The	threat	of	global	warming	seemed	to	confirm	the	findings	 of	 the	 influential	 Brundtland	 Report,	 which	 concluded	 that	 environmental	trends	exist	“that	threaten	to	radically	alter	the	planet,	that	threaten	the	lives	of	many	species	upon	it,	including	the	human	species”	(World	Commission	on	Environment	and	Development	 1987:	 2).	 In	 terms	 of	 both	 its	 ambition	 and	 potential	 scope,	 climate	protection	 was	 thus	 a	 prime	 example	 of	 the	 ‘new	 world	 order’	 ambition	 that	characterised	international	relations	after	the	end	of	the	Cold	War.			Many	of	 the	UNFCCC’s	 core	elements	 confirmed	 the	 solidarist	 ambition	behind	international	climate	politics	in	the	early	1990s.	At	the	heart	of	the	climate	regime	is	a	multilateral	 process	 of	 agreeing	 international	 rules	 for	 reducing	 greenhouse	 gas	emissions.	From	the	beginning,	the	UNFCCC	negotiations	followed	a	strictly	multilateral	model,	 with	 consensus-based	 decision-making	 and	 a	 bargaining	 process	 that	 gave	weaker	 nations	 more	 ‘voice’	 than	 was	 common	 in	 other	 multilateral	 regimes.	 The	Conference	 of	 the	 Parties	 (COP)	 to	 the	 UNFCCC,	 the	 regime’s	 chief	 decision-making	body,	meets	every	year	for	a	two-week	session,	and	additional	negotiation	sessions	are	held	in	between	COPs	with	increasing	frequency.	Over	the	years,	the	negotiations	have	
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attracted	growing	numbers	of	observers,	with	separate	forums	for	nonstate	actors	now	being	 convened	 alongside	 the	 intergovernmental	 COP.	 Despite	 complaints	 by	 some	observers	about	lack	of	transparency	and	access,	the	climate	negotiations	are	a	far	cry	from	the	exclusive	nature	of	traditional	diplomacy.	Thousands	of	climate	scientists,	legal	experts,	 diplomats	 and	 campaigners	 now	 routinely	 gather	 for	 annual	 negotiations,	making	 the	 UNFCCC	 one	 of	 the	 largest	 and	most	 accessible	 forums	 for	 debating	 and	deciding	global	policy.			 The	UNFCCC’s	early	emphasis	on	developing	 legal	agreements	and	 instruments	that	regulate	greenhouse	gas	emissions	also	marks	it	out	as	a	predominantly	solidarist	regime.	Following	 the	model	of	 the	successful	ozone	negotiations,	 the	climate	process	was	 designed	 to	 agree	 a	 succession	 of	 legally	 binding	 protocols	 that	 add	 regulatory	specificity	and	clout	to	the	framework	convention’s	climate	protection	norm.	All	nations	were	meant	to	be	bound	by	legally	enshrined	obligations,	with	industrialised	countries	carrying	the	main	mitigation	burden.	And	further	international	institution-building	was	needed	to	support	the	implementation	of	the	legal	obligations.	The	Clean	Development	Mechanism	 led	 to	 the	 development	 of	 an	 elaborate	 international	 bureaucracy	 that	assesses	 and	 approves	 proposals	 for	 investment	 in	 emission-reducing	 projects,	while	the	 global	 system	 for	 emissions	 trading	 required	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 system	 of	international	 property	 rights	 in	 emissions	 (so-called	 emission	 permits)	 that	 can	 be	traded	in	specially	designed	international	markets.		 The	 UNFCCC	 regime	 is	 also	 based	 on	 strong	 equity	 norms	 that	 apportion	 the	greatest	 burden	 for	 climate	mitigation	 to	 the	most	 advanced	 industrialised	 countries.	The	 framework	 convention’s	 principle	 of	 ‘common	 but	 differentiated	 responsibilities’	(CBDR),	which	is	also	anchored	in	the	Rio	Declaration	of	the	1992	UNCED,	came	to	be	interpreted	 as	 providing	 for	 a	 strict	 distinction	 between	 developed	 and	 developing	countries	 in	the	1997	Kyoto	Protocol,	with	the	 latter	being	exempted	from	any	legally	binding	 emission	 reductions.	 By	 basing	 the	 mitigation	 burden	 on	 the	 historical	responsibility	of	 industrialised	countries,	 the	climate	regime	adopted	a	strong	climate	justice	 principle	with	 considerable	 distributional	 consequences,	which	would	 later	 be	contested	by	the	United	States	and	other	industrialised	countries	(Hurrell	and	Sengupta	2012).			
A	 crisis	 of	 solidarism?	 International	 climate	 politics	 between	 great	
power	politics	and	transnationalism		While	 the	scale	of	solidarist	ambition	 in	 the	climate	regime	 is	 indeed	striking,	 it	 is	 far	from	clear	how	much	of	 this	ambition	has	been	 realized.	This	 section	analyses	 recent	trends	in	international	climate	politics	that	cast	light	on	the	ongoing	tensions	between	solidarist	 and	 pluralist	 logics	 of	 international	 cooperation.	 Three	 developments,	 in	particular,	 signal	 a	 fundamental	 and	 potentially	 lasting	 shift	 in	 the	 nature	 of	 global	climate	governance:	first,	the	repeated	failure	to	negotiate	a	successor	agreement	to	the	Kyoto	Protocol	has	 revealed	both	 the	 limitations	of	 the	 current	multilateral	 approach	
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and	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 great	 powers	 to	 scale	 back	 the	 regime’s	 original	 solidarist	ambition.	 Second,	 some	 of	 the	 largest	 emitters,	 which	 also	 happen	 to	 be	 the	 most	powerful	states	in	international	society,	have	forced	through	a	change	in	the	regulatory	approach,	 replacing	 top-down	 regulations	a	la	 Kyoto	with	 the	Paris	Agreement’s	new	bottom-up	approach	based	on	voluntary	pledges.	And	third,	the	apparent	failure	of	the	inter-governmental	regime	to	rein	in	rising	greenhouse	gas	emissions	has	created	space	for	other	actors	to	step	in	and	create	new	forms	of	climate	governance,	pointing	to	an	enhanced	 role	of	nonstate	 actors	 and	more	 complex	and	hybrid	 forms	of	 authority	 in	global	climate	politics.		Intriguingly,	therefore,	just	as	the	state-centric	solidarist	vision	of	the	UNFCCC	has	been	called	into	question,	a	new	cosmopolitan	solidarism	based	on	greater	 involvement	 of	 world	 society	 is	 emerging	 as	 a	 potentially	 more	 radical	alternative	in	the	form	of	transnational	climate	governance.			
The	crisis	of	multilateralism:	a	case	for	great	power	management?			The	 UNFCCC’s	 strong	 version	 of	 multilateralism	 was	 originally	 seen	 as	 one	 of	 the	regime’s	main	strengths.	This	is	no	longer	the	case.	Failure	to	agree	strong	and	legally	binding	 emission	 reduction	 targets	 has	 led	 to	 growing	 criticism	 of	 the	 UNFCCC’s	burdensome	 and	 slow	 procedures.	 Basing	 decisions	 on	 the	 consensus	 principle	 and	allowing	every	state	a	say	in	the	crafting	of	mitigation	policies	may	have	ensured	a	high	degree	of	procedural	legitimacy	for	the	regime,	but	this	has	come	at	high	costs	in	terms	of	ineffective	bargaining	and	political	inertia.			 The	 experience	 of	 the	 2009	 Copenhagen	 conference,	 in	 particular,	 was	 a	watershed	 event	 in	 this	 regard.	 Parties	 had	 spent	 two	 years	 preparing	 for	 the	conference,	 which	 was	meant	 to	 adopt	 a	 new	 treaty,	 and	 negotiators	 from	 over	 190	countries	spent	a	further	two	weeks	in	Copenhagen	going	over	a	heavily	bracketed	text	without	resolving	the	underlying	differences.	It	took	a	small	group	of	powerful	heads	of	government	to	break	the	impasse	and	draft	a	compromise	agreement	in	the	final	hours	of	 the	conference.	The	resulting	document,	 the	Copenhagen	Accord,	was	not	based	on	the	 official	 negotiation	 text,	 leading	 to	 protests	 among	 developing	 countries	 who	objected	to	being	presented	with	what	amounted	to	a	great	power	fait	accompli.	In	the	end,	the	conference	merely	‘noted’	the	text,	although	the	subsequent	COP	later	adopted	it	as	part	of	the	Cancun	agreements	in	2010	(Falkner	et	al.	2010).	Copenhagen	had	laid	bare	the	inefficiencies	of	a	strict	multilateral	approach	and	for	the	first	time	introduced	a	 different	 negotiating	 process	 in	 which	 the	 great	 powers	 play	 a	 leading	 role	 in	hammering	out	the	core	deal	that	forms	the	basis	for	a	broader	multilateral	agreement.	It	 was	 thus	 at	 Copenhagen	 that	 the	 pluralist	 institution	 of	 great	 power	management	emerged	as	a	potential	alternative	to,	or	modification	of,	climate	multilateralism.			 The	 debate	 about	 alternative	 forums	 for	 negotiating	 climate	 change	 goes	 back	well	before	the	Copenhagen	conference.	Existing	institutions	such	as	the	G-8	and	G-20	have	provided	a	platform	 for	high-level	political	dialogue	on	climate	change,	and	new	forums	 (Asia-Pacific	 Partnership;	 Major	 Economies	 Forum)	 were	 created	 by	 the	 US	alongside	the	UNFCCC	to	promote	minilateral	cooperation	on	energy	efficiency	and	low-
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carbon	 technology	 transfer.	 There	 is	 now	 a	 burgeoning	 debate	 on	 the	 benefits	 of	minilateral	climate	clubs,	which	are	either	seen	as	providing	a	more	effective	means	for	agreeing	mitigation	 policies	 among	 a	 select	 group	 of	 climate	 powers	 or	 as	 offering	 a	better	 framework	 for	 enforcing	 such	 agreements	 (Falkner	 2016a).	 As	 recent	 bilateral	agreements	 between	 the	 US	 and	 China	 have	 shown,	 the	 main	 players	 in	 the	 climate	negotiations	 increasingly	 seek	 to	discuss	 cooperation	on	mitigation	 strategies	 outside	the	multilateral	framework.	As	climate	change	has	gained	in	political	salience,	the	great	powers	 have	 increasingly	 relied	 on	 traditional	 channels	 for	 communication	 and	negotiation	among	them.			 The	 intensification	 of	 great-power	 dialogue	 reflects	 in	 part	 growing	dissatisfaction	with	climate	multilateralism.	However,	we	are	still	 far	 from	a	situation	where	 minilateralism	 and	 great	 power	 management	 could	 replace	 the	 multilateral	process.	 The	 UNFCCC’s	 legitimacy	 remains	 high	 particularly	 among	 developing	countries	 and	 environmental	 campaign	 groups,	 and	 even	 if	 minilateral	 climate	 clubs	were	to	emerge	in	the	future	it	 is	just	as	likely	that	they	would	want	to	work	with	the	multilateral	regime	and	the	services	it	provides	(e.g.	emission	reporting	and	accounting	systems)	than	seek	to	replace	it.	None	of	the	existing	minilateral	initiatives	has	gained	sufficient	support	among	negotiators	and	campaigners	to	make	it	a	viable	alternative	to	the	core	regime	(Hjerpe	and	Nasiritousi	2015).			 What	we	are	witnessing,	therefore,	is	not	a	full-scale	replacement	of	the	UNFCCC	process	 with	 a	 minilateral	 alternative	 but	 a	 rebalancing	 between	 the	 solidarist	 and	pluralist	logics	of	climate	cooperation.	Great	powers	are	increasingly	unencumbered	by	the	 conventions	 of	 multilateralism,	 seeking	 out	 opportunities	 for	 bilateral	 and	plurilateral	side-deals,	even	though	they	feel	compelled	to	continue	to	work	within	the	multilateral	framework.			
The	Kyoto	Protocol:	state	solidarism	in	decline			One	of	the	main	consequences	of	the	return	of	great	power	diplomacy	in	climate	politics	has	been	a	 shift	 in	 the	 international	 regulatory	approach	away	 from	the	 international	law-based	 model	 of	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 and	 towards	 a	 more	 flexible	 and	 voluntary	approach.	 The	 United	 States	 has	 long	 argued	 against	 top-down	 and	 legally	 binding	emission	 reductions	 targets.	 But	 while	 the	 other	 major	 emitters	 have	 until	 recently	advocated	 Kyoto	 Protocol-style	 regulations,	 this	 is	 no	 longer	 the	 case.	 Several	 major	powers	that	had	ratified	the	Kyoto	Protocol	are	no	longer	willing	to	be	bound	by	it	in	its	second	commitment	period	(Canada,	Russia,	Japan).	And	while	the	European	Union	and	most	 developing	 countries	 continued	 to	 advocate	 legally	 binding	 targets,	 the	negotiations	 on	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 saw	 a	 big	 shift	 towards	 a	 bottom-up	 approach	(Falkner	 2016b).	 The	 traditional	 solidarist	 solution	 of	 tying	 the	main	 emitters	 into	 a	legally	defined	system	of	obligations	is	no	longer	at	the	heart	of	the	emerging	mitigation	regime.			 It	should	be	noted,	of	course,	 that	 the	UNFCCC	always	combined	top-down	and	bottom-up	 regulatory	 elements:	 Article	 4.1	 expected	 all	 parties	 to	 develop	 national	
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policies	in	a	bottom-up	fashion	while	Article	4.2	expected	developed	countries	to	reduce	emissions	according	to	a	specific	deadline,	an	aim	that	was	later	legally	enshrined	in	the	Kyoto	Protocol	(Bodansky	2011).	But	it	was	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	with	its	internationally	agreed	 emission	 reduction	 targets,	 that	 embodied	 the	 solidarist	 ambition	 behind	 the	climate	regime.	National	targets	were	to	be	negotiated	multilaterally	and	established	in	a	treaty	framework,	rather	than	chosen	according	to	domestic	policy	priorities.	In	this	sense,	 the	climate	regime	followed	very	closely	the	example	of	 the	Vienna	Convention	on	 ozone	 layer	 depletion,	 which	 led	 to	 the	 legally	 binding	 CFC	 emission	 reductions	scheme	 in	 the	 Montreal	 Protocol.	 By	 creating	 international	 legal	 obligations	 for	mitigation,	 international	 society	 would	 gradually	 and	 collectively	 reduce	 greenhouse	gas	emissions.	Enforcement	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol	was	never	a	realistic	scenario,	but	the	emphasis	 on	 legal	 obligations	 signaled	 that	 collective	 responsibility	 and	 common	purpose	informed	the	international	response	to	global	warming.				 In	the	new	regulatory	approach	of	the	Paris	Agreement,	national	pledges	reflect	domestic	 willingness	 to	 act	 rather	 than	 international	 obligations.	 The	 parties	 to	 the	agreement	 have	 committed	 to	 submitting	 national	 pledges,	 so-called	 ‘Nationally	Determined	Contributions’	(NDCs),	that	can	then	be	added	up	to	establish	the	collective	effort,	allowing	negotiators	to	establish	the	gap	that	exists	between	existing	mitigation	policies	and	the	effort	needed	to	keep	global	warming	to	the	below	20C.	This	 is	not	to	suggest	 that	what	 is	happening	 is	a	complete	hollowing	out	of	 the	solidarist	nature	of	the	 existing	 regime.	 Several	 international	 institutions	 that	 were	 created	 under	 the	auspices	 of	 the	 UNFCCC	 will	 continue	 to	 play	 an	 important	 role:	 	 the	 Green	 Climate	Fund,	which	is	to	distribute	a	large	part	of	the	international	climate	finance	promised	by	donor	countries;	a	new	technology	mechanism,	which	will	facilitate	greater	technology	transfer	 and	 diffusion;	 and	 the	 framework	 for	 reducing	 emissions	 from	deforestation	and	forest	degradation	(REDD),	which	is	intended	to	support	the	protection	of	forests	in	developing	countries.	But	it	is	clear	that	the	outcome	of	the	Paris	COP	in	2015	signals	a	retrenchment	 of	 solidarist	 ambition	 and	 a	 re-assertion	 of	 a	 pluralist	 logic	 of	 de-centralised	coordination	that	protects	national	sovereignty.		
New	forms	of	climate	governance	and	the	rise	of	transnational	solidarism			Partly	 in	 response	 to	 the	 weakening	 of	 state-centric	 solidarism	 as	 the	 dominant	response	 to	 climate	 change,	 a	 different	 global	 approach	 has	 emerged	 in	 recent	 years	that	 is	 based	 on	 greater	 involvement	 of	 nonstate	 actors	 and	 reliance	 on	 private	 or	hybrid	 sources	 of	 global	 authority.	 So-called	 private	 environmental	 governance	 has	been	 on	 the	 rise	 since	 at	 least	 the	 1990s	 (Falkner	 2003),	 and	 from	 the	 early	 2000s	onwards,	 more	 and	 more	 private	 and	 public-private	 initiatives	 have	 sprung	 up	 that	focus	on	climate	change	mitigation	and	adaptation.	As	the	sense	of	dissatisfaction	with	the	 contributions	 of	 the	 intergovernmental	 regime	 has	 grown,	 so	 have	 new	transnational	 actors	 sought	 to	 experiment	 with	 novel	 approaches	 to	 reducing	greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	 (Hoffmann	 2011).	 There	 now	 exists	 a	 lively	 field	 of	transnational	 climate	 governance	 with	 a	 multitude	 of	 actors	 (municipalities,	 cities,	
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corporations,	 NGOs)	 advancing	 new	 governance	 solutions	 at	 local,	 regional	 and	transnational	 levels	 (Bulkeley	 et	 al.	 2014).	 Whether	 these	 new	 initiatives	 will	 be	effective	in	reducing	greenhouse	gas	emissions	–	and	can	therefore	be	seen	as	a	viable	alternative	to	state-centric	climate	governance	–	remains	to	be	seen.	But	it	is	becoming	clear	that	the	growing	interest	among	nonstate	actors	in	taking	action	on	their	own,	or	in	partnership	with	state	authorities,	suggests	at	least	the	beginning	of	a	profound	shift	in	the	international	politics	of	climate	change.		 The	 emerging	 field	 of	 transnational	 climate	 governance	 is	 characterized	 by	considerable	 diversity,	 overlap	 and	 fragmentation.	 A	 myriad	 of	 actors	 have	 created	initiatives	 that	 seek	 to	 disseminate	 information,	 coordinate	 voluntary	 efforts	 of	emission	 reductions,	 set	 regulatory	 standards,	 or	 create	 certification	 schemes	 to	promote	low-carbon	technologies	or	products.	They	include,	to	name	but	a	few,	the	C40	Cities	Climate	Leadership	Group,	CDP	(formerly	Carbon	Disclosure	Project),	Greenhouse	Gas	 Protocol	 (GHGP),	 Global	 Reporting	 Initiative	 (GRI),	 and	 various	 carbon	 off-set	 or	accounting	 schemes.	 Some	of	 these	 initiatives	 are	 created	 and	maintained	by	 a	 single	type	of	actors	 (e.g.	NGOs	or	business)	or	by	alliances	of	different	 types	of	actors,	 also	including	 state	 authorities.	 In	 some	 cases,	 transnational	 initiatives	 respond	 to	intergovernmental	 developments	 or	 seek	 to	 assist	 with	 the	 implementation	 of	internationally	agreed	objectives.	In	other	cases,	they	aim	to	fill	governance	gaps	left	by	international	organisations	or	states,	thereby	enlarging	the	field	of	global	governance.			 Viewed	 from	 an	 English	 School	 perspective,	 the	 growth	 in	 transnational	governance	 approaches	 gives	 rise	 to	 a	 different	 scenario	 in	 the	 evolution	 of	international	 society.	 Whereas	 greater	 reliance	 on	 great	 power	 diplomacy	 and	management	 and	 the	 decline	 of	 international	 law-based	 regulation	 indicate	 a	weakening	of	state-centric	solidarism,	the	growth	of	global	governance	rooted	in	world	society	suggests	a	shift	towards	a	multi-centric,	transnational,	form	of	solidarism.	What	we	 are	 witnessing	 here	 is	 a	 complex	 process	 of	 bypassing	 and	 redefining	 state	sovereignty	 by	 nonstate	 actors	 that	 are	 assuming	 greater	 global	 responsibility	themselves.			 The	 increasing	 significance	 of	 nonstate	 governance	 does	 not	 in	 itself	 signal	 a	decline	 of	 state-centric	 governance.	 International	 society	 and	 world	 society	 are	 not	trapped	 in	 some	 kind	 of	 zero-sum	 logic.	 They	 can	 augment	 and	 support	 each	 other,	performing	 complementary	 functions	 and	 contributing	 to	 the	 growth	 of	 ever	 more	complex,	multi-layered	global	governance.	Indeed,	in	the	field	of	climate	change,	states	and	international	organizations	increasingly	seek	to	steer	and	orchestrate	transnational	actors	and	networks	(Hale	and	Roger	2014).		 The	rise	in	transnational	climate	initiatives	thus	points	to	a	transformation	in	the	solidarist	project	of	building	global	climate	governance.	We	are	witnessing	a	shift	from	the	 statist	 version	 of	 solidarism,	which	 focused	 on	 the	 creation	 of	 intergovernmental	regulatory	 authority	 to	 bring	 about	 a	 reduction	 in	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions,	 and	towards	 a	 more	 hybrid	 model	 with	 greater	 involvement	 of	 other	 actors	 and	 a	 more	decentralized	 form	of	steering	social	and	economic	actors.	National	sovereignty	 is	not	
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so	much	being	eroded	as	it	is	bypassed,	supplemented	and	shared	with	other	actors	at	sub-national	and	transnational	levels.			
Conclusions		The	 rise	 of	 global	 environmentalism	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century	 has	 led	 to	 a	 profound	transformation	of	international	society.	As	states	have	come	to	accept	a	responsibility	to	protect	the	global	environment,	they	have	successfully	expanded	international	society’s	normative	 basis	 to	 include	 a	 concern	 for	 the	 health	 and	 survival	 of	 the	 natural	environment.	This	development	marks	a	distinctive	solidarist	moment	in	the	evolution	of	international	society.	Just	as	in	the	case	of	the	rise	of	human	rights,	the	growth	of	the	international	 environmental	 agenda	 has	 led	 to	 a	 dramatic	 increase	 in	 international	institution-building	 and	 rule-making,	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 growing	 body	 of	 international	environmental	law,	and	a	reinterpretation	of	what	it	means	to	be	a	sovereign	state	with	territorial	 control	 over	 a	 nation’s	 natural	 resources.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 rise	 of	 global	environmentalism	 represents	 a	 progressive	 moment	 in	 the	 move	 from	 a	 pluralist	Westphalian	system	towards	a	more	solidarist	international	order.			 As	 the	 empirical	 case	 study	 of	 climate	 politics	 has	 shown,	 however,	 the	progressive	narrative	of	environmental	solidarism	is	not	a	straightforward	one.	Despite	a	 deeply	 ambitious	 international	 treaty	 that	 set	 off	 a	 long-running	 process	 of	international	 negotiation	 and	 institution-building,	 the	multilateral	 climate	 regime	 has	never	 managed	 to	 develop	 the	 depth	 of	 commitment	 and	 strength	 of	 institutional	governance	to	rein	in	global	greenhouse	gas	emissions.	Well	over	two	decades	after	the	UNFCCC’s	adoption,	the	climate	negotiations	have	failed	to	produce	the	internationally	agreed	 and	 legally	 codified	 emission	 reduction	 targets	 that	 the	 original	 solidarist	approach	envisaged.			 Viewed	 from	an	English	School	perspective,	 three	 trends	can	be	 identified	 that	suggest	 a	 profound	 shift	 in	 the	 international	 politics	 of	 climate	 change.	 First,	 as	 the	salience	of	the	climate	issue	has	increased,	the	great	powers	have	increasingly	sought	to	break	 out	 of	 the	 multilateral	 straightjacket	 of	 the	 UNFCCC	 and	 explored	 political	compromises	 in	bilateral	 and	minilateral	 forums.	Since	 the	Copenhagen	conference	 in	2009,	 the	pluralist	 institutions	of	great	power	management	has	surfaced	more	clearly	than	ever	before	 in	climate	politics,	even	 though	 it	 is	 far	 from	replacing	 the	solidarist	norm	of	multilateralism.	The	great	powers	remain	committed	 to	 the	UNFCCC	process,	even	 if	 they	 are	 not	 willing	 to	 let	 it	 play	 the	 kind	 of	 role	 that	 solidarists	 envisage.	Second,	while	 all	 great	 powers	 are	 conscious	 of	 their	 climate	 responsibility,	most	 are	unwilling	 to	 subject	 their	mitigation	 policies	 to	multilateral	 decision-making	 and	 are	therefore	 seeking	 to	 change	 the	 existing	 regulatory	 approach	 from	 a	 top-down	 to	 a	more	 bottom-up	 system	 of	 voluntary	 pledges.	 A	 pluralist	 logic	 of	 preserving	 national	sovereignty	 and	 the	 diversity	 of	 national	 preferences	 has	 prevailed	 over	 solidarist	efforts	to	arrive	at	common	goals	and	internationally	agreed	policies	that	are	enshrined	in	international	law.	And	third,	the	looming	crisis	of	state-centric	solidarism	in	climate	politics	has	mobilized	nonstate	actors	to	experiment	with	new	forms	of	global	climate	
 18 
governance	outside	the	intergovernmental	realm.	World	society	has	become	the	site	of	a	growing	field	of	governance	experimentation,	 leading	to	reconfigurations	of	political	authority	within	and	beyond	national	boundaries.	The	growing	engagement	of	nonstate	actors	 suggests	 a	 shift	 in	 the	 solidarist	 project	 away	 from	 its	 traditional	 state-centric	orientation	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 more	 cosmopolitan	 direction,	 even	 if	 the	 multitude	 and	diversity	of	transnational	actors	and	initiatives	is	as	yet	far	removed	form	the	visions	of	a	global	polity	based	on	world	society.			 As	 this	 chapter	has	demonstrated,	 the	 rise	of	 global	 environmentalism	offers	a	fruitful	empirical	field	for	the	study	of	normative	change	in	international	relations.	For	English	School	scholars,	 it	provides	a	test	case	to	examine	the	ways	 in	which	pluralist	and	solidarist	logics	interact	in	given	policy	domains.	At	the	same	time,	environmental	scholars	 in	 International	 Relations	 can	 benefit	 from	 engagement	 with	 the	 English	School,	in	that	it	offers	a	holistic	theoretical	framework	for	the	study	of	deep-seated	and	long-term	processes	of	international	change.	The	English	School	has	made	a	distinctive	contribution	to	the	study	of	progressive	change	in	international	relations,	distinguishing	between	primary	institutions	that	make	up	international	society’s	constitutional	order	and	secondary	institutions	that	are	purposefully	built	to	regulate	specific	policy	areas.	If	environmental	 responsibility	 has	 indeed	 emerged	 as	 a	 primary	 institution	 in	international	 society,	 as	 a	 growing	 number	 of	 scholars	 has	 come	 to	 conclude,	 then	future	 research	 should	 be	 directed	 to	 examine	 in	 more	 detail	 how	 this	 particular	primary	 institution	 relates	 to,	 and	 often	 clashes	 with,	 more	 established	 institutions	(multilateralism,	 sovereignty,	 great	 power	 management)	 and	 how	 tensions	 between	conflicting	 primary	 institutions	 can	 be	 reduced.	 This	 would	 provide	 at	 least	 some	insights	 into	 the	 conditions	 for	making	 further	progress	 in	 embedding	 environmental	norms	in	international	society.			
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